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Clark D. Cunn

Pn,fasor Cumzingham was the winner of the
1988 Scholarly Paper Competition sponsored by
the Association of American Lnw Schools. The
following article is nn abridged version of that
winning paper, adapted from a transcript of his
Ipresentation to the 1988 AALS Annual Meeting.
His thesis is that semantic analysis 4 "common
sense" meanings of the word "search" can pro.:: vide an approach to interpreting the scope of the
Fourth Amendment which is both faithful to the
text .and flexible emuah to meet the demands of
,changing times. In a kuch longer article tireiring
- in 73 Iowa Law m i n o NO. 3 (March 1.988) k
, supports his "common sense approach" with a
detailed analysis of the amendment's legislative
history and its relation to pre-Revolutionary
events and, picking up where this paper ends,
applies the semantic analysis to the Supreme
Court's major cases of the lasf 20 years
:which have interpreted the scope of the
i Fourth Amendment.
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&king high resolution aerial photographs of an open
air chemical plant, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
(1986);(5)picking up a stereo turntable and looking at
the serial number on the bottom, Arizona v. Hicks (1987);
and (6) peering into a barn interior with a flashlight
to see an illicit drug laboratory, United States v. Dunn
(1987).
The decisions in these six cases provoked startling
dissension among the members of the Court. No one
justice joined the majority opinion in all six cases and
a l l but three joined harsh dissents in at least one case.
The inability of the current Court to agree consist
what "search" means in the Fourth Amendment
mirrored by a universal complaint hwn the scholarly

community
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not make
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The problems we have today can be traced back
60 years ago to the famous Supreme Court case of
United States v. Olmstead (1928). Federal agents had
listened to Olmstead's telephone conversations by
placing a wiretapping device on the telephone wire
at a point outside Olmstead's property. The question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether that
activity was a search and therefore fell within the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In
a 5-4 decision the Court held that no search warrant
was required because no search took place.
The Court was split between two dramatically
opposed positions expressed in the majority o p h o n
by Chief Justice Taft and a famous dissent by Justice
Brandeis. Thft said:
&T
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The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of
material things - the person, the house, his papers or
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Justice Brandeis not only expanded the textual "right
to be secure" into a more general right of privacy; he
also effectively removed the limiting phrase "against
unreasonable searches and seizures" by insisting
that the means employed were irrelqvant. His
"interpretation" could therefore be fairly characterized as an amendment, illustrated by superimposing
@+&the language of his dissent on the constitutional text
&using
., ,X +the style of statutory drafting:

in the Amendment can mean both "search of' and
"search out," but not "search fof and have applied the
common sense approach to the Court's post-Katz cases,
including the six recent cases which provoked such
dissension on the Court.)
Some readers may suspect at this point that my
ultimate goal is to make a normative claim: that
semantic analysis will produce the authoritative
interpretation of "search* in the Fourth Amendment.
I am not making the claim that semantic analysis
The right of the people [to be s e w in their persons,
will lead to the Grail of constitutional scholars: the
houses, papers and effects]TO BE LET ALONE [against
"right answer" to what given constitutionalproviunreasonable searches and seizures1 shall not be
sions mean. The common sense approach is at best a
plausible interpretation of "search," not necessarily
the "correct" interpretation.
I will confess, however, that there is a normative
component to my project but it is not addressed to the
question of authority. I believe that the common sense
Because of this willingness 6 change or abandon
approach deserves serious consideration because it
...textuallanguage to implement underlying policy.
gives coherent shape to the developing case law and
%,$?&%
*$J have called the interpretation exemplified by
provides a basis for reasoned debate. The Supreme
;&Brandeis's dissent the policy interpretation.
Court's current interpretation of "search is that "a
%& From 1928 to the
day debates over
'search' occurs whe; an expectation of privacy that
constitutional interpretation continue to be polarized
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."
This formulation, usually referred to as the "legitibetween the positions typified by the Taft and Brandeis
mate expectation of priiaqf' test, has pmduceh
&pinions. ' I h s the ap&i
t overding of Olmstead by
eh@
$?
Supreme Courfs seminal 1967 decision in Kntz v. ?$$
s ~
:$\,,L, an incoherent body of decisions and has deprived
gZ$+:;$j the country of a meaningful vocabulary to use in
%X$%,~::United
?-L*+,.,
States has taken on doctrinal significance
$"j;,beyond the confines of Fourth Amendment law. Many 88 discussing the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
One can say with some certainty that the Court's
commentators assume that Kafz represents the ultimate
%victory of the policy interpretation'of the scope of the
interpretatibn is so vague as to be literally meaningless,
Amendment.
3yp5v;>7 without regard to whether or not the interpretation is
.,~ourth
" '"
"correct." Indeed, we can not even discuss its correctness
The
purpose
of
my
paper
is
to
demonstrate
that
:
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unless we are able to understand what it means.
there is a viable interpretive approach between these
The demand that a key legal term like "search" be
extremes, which I call the "common sense approach."
meaningful is such an obvious normative claim that we
p~,wThisinterpretation retains the textual language much
tend to ignore its importance. The fundamental value
.&*more than the policy interpretation yet expands the
of a common sense interpretation of a legal text is that
eaning of search beyond the limitations of Taft's
its meaning draws on the enormous existing semantic
opinion. The Common Sense Approach is grounded
resources of everyday language. We lose these
in semantic analysis of the word "search as used
resources whenever we disregard the common sense
everyday language. This analysis draws on the
meaning
of a kgal t a t . I am not saying that a court
<:linguistic
competence
shared
by
all
English
speakers
:-G4.* 5%
should never move away from the common sense
i,lB4'Tfto reveal that "search" has three distinct senses with
interpretation of a text, but only that there are
differing semantic structures: (1)to make a search
substantial costs incurred when a court does so. The
of something, (2) to search fm something, and (3) to
current state of Fourth Amendment law is powerful
search out something. First I will desaibe the semantic
evidence of these costs. Semantic analysis suggests that
features which constiwte and distinguish these three
these costs need not be incurred by revealing within
senses. I will then use this semantic analysis to
' describe the transition from Olmstead to Katz, and I will
the "common sense" meaning of even a seemingly
< .*?simple word like "search* much of the flexibility that
f-p?;: claim that the Katz decision most accurately is desaibed
advocates of the poky interpretation seek and despair
g% as an application of the common sense approach. (In
of finding in the t e n a n o w literalism represented by
%,-?
my
Iowa
Law
Review
article
I
have
explained
the
textual
'-6.
Taft's opinion.
2-qw and historical reasons for concluding that 'searches"
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sense does not contain an affected object feature
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yet no one would think that the Fourth Amendment
applied it to that activity. What made the action in
Silvmnan different from pounding a nail into the wall?
Not the fact of movement into an area, the distinctive
semantic feature of "searchof."If there was a search
at dl, it was because the FBI searched out the
conversations that were taking place in Silverman's
home by the use of this microphone. The fact that there
was an actual physical intrusion really was irrelevant.
tate of Fourth Amendment law
famous 1967 decision
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